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Abstract 
The Implicit Association Test and its variants have become pervasive measures of attitudes in a 
variety of domains and contexts. In two experiments, we provide evidence that a recent variant, 
the Personalized IAT developed by Olson and Fazio (2004) may more accurately detect changes 
in personal attitudes than the conventional Traditional IAT devised by Greenwald, McGhee, and 
Schwartz (1998). Our findings suggest that the Personalized IAT may be more sensitive to 
detecting attitude changes than the Traditional IAT because it is less affected by extrapersonal 
associations (i. e. salient associations not contributing to personal evaluations of the object). 
More generally, this research suggests that for attitude domains characterized by potentially 
strong extrapersonal associations, using the Personalized and Traditional IATs may provide 
researchers with complementary insights about knowledge structures.   
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Detecting Attitude Change with the Implicit Association Test 
 
  The Implicit Association Test (IAT) devised by Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998) 
is a widely used tool for the study of implicit cognitions in a variety of domains. Considerable 
empirical evidence has accumulated in recent years about the validity of the IAT as an 
appropriate measure of automatically-activated attitudes about a given object. Extant research has 
investigated several validity aspects of the IAT including nomological, convergent, discriminant 
and predictive validity (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). In terms of predictive validity, 
the IAT has been shown to relate to object-related memory biases, explicit attitude measures and 
preferences, as well as some forms of behavior (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, in 
press; Nosek, 2005).  
  In the present research, we investigate yet another facet of the IAT’s validity—its capacity 
to capture attitude change. Prior research evidences mixed results about the sensitivity of IAT 
measures to persuasive messages (for a review, see Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, in press). Some 
studies show that IAT effects, unlike explicit attitude measures, seem quite resistant to various 
forms of persuasion (e. g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). However, 
other research demonstrates that sometimes even subtle manipulations can induce changes in 
attitudes as reflected by IAT effects (e. g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). Indeed, Lane et al. (2007) recognized a gap in our 
understanding of why these discrepancies may precisely occur. The purpose of the present 
research is to bring some elements of answer to this complex issue from a methodological 
perspective.   
We argue that one of the reasons for the differential sensitivity of IAT measures across 
domains and contexts is the extent to which extrapersonal associations affect the outcome of a    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  4
particular measurement technique implemented. Extrapersonal associations constitute object-
related information that is accessible in memory yet does not contribute to an individual’s 
evaluation of an object (Olson & Fazio, 2004). On the basis of Olson and Fazio (2004) and Han, 
Olson, and Fazio (2006), we propose that for some attitude domains, the traditional IAT 
developed by Greenwald et al. (1998) is more open to the unwanted influence of extrapersonal 
associations than the personalized IAT. The Han et al. (2006) findings demonstrate that 
extrapersonal associations can create the appearance of change on a traditional IAT, even when 
there is good reason to believe that no such change occurred. For example, a clearly invalid 
assertion uttered by a 10-year old child did not impact the personalized IAT, a measure of 
automatically-activated attitudes based on a subliminal evaluative priming paradigm, or choice 
behavior. Yet, the extrapersonal association offered by the child did affect the traditional IAT. 
We believe that it also is possible for extrapersonal associations to influence a traditional 
IAT in such a way as to obscure the presence of real attitude change. The purpose of the present 
research is to explore this heretofore unexamined possibility. If actual attitude change is induced, 
extrapersonal associations may mask the attitude change more in the traditional IAT than in the 
personalized IAT. For this reason, the personalized IAT should perform better in detecting real 
attitude changes than the traditional IAT. We present two experiments examining this reasoning. 
The Two IAT Variants and Persuasion Attempts 
Features of the Two IAT Variants 
 
The original IAT developed in Greenwald et al.’s seminal paper (1998) compares 
response latencies in sorting tasks involving compatible and incompatible combinations of 
attitude objects (e.g. flowers vs. insects) and valence attributes (e.g. pleasant vs. unpleasant). It is 
based on the rationale that if individuals have a positive attitude toward flowers but not insects,    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  5
they should more easily (i.e. more quickly) associate pleasant words with flower names than with 
insect names.  
Olson and Fazio (2004) argued that the measurement outcome of the traditional IAT could 
reflect the combined influence of two types of associations: personal and extrapersonal. Personal 
associations reflect accessible information that contributes to individual attitudes toward the 
attitude object; whereas extrapersonal associations correspond to accessible information that does 
not contribute to individual attitudes. For example, these extrapersonal associations may form on 
the basis of information acquired through social interaction and from the media and can reflect 
culturally stereotypic knowledge (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Extant research shows that the 
traditional IAT is contaminated by extrapersonal associations that are accessible at the time of 
categorizing an attitude object (Olson & Fazio, 2004; Han et al., 2006). For this reason, Olson 
and Fazio (2004) devised a “personalized” version of the IAT that focuses on personal 
associations to a greater extent than the traditional IAT. The two most important changes with 
respect to the traditional IAT involve suppressing error feedback and changing the category 
labels from pleasant to I like and from unpleasant to I don’t like. These two changes are intended 
to focus thoughts on personal likes and dislikes. Error feedback, at least with respect to the trials 
involving pleasant/unpleasant categorizations, encourages a normative focus by indicating that a 
correct answer, independently of the person’s own liking or disliking of the target objects, exists. 
The labels pleasant/unpleasant or good/bad allow for such an interpretation, enabling 
extrapersonal associations to intervene in solving the mapping problem of the IAT. In contrast, 
the use of the labels I like/I don’t like precludes such construals because it focuses attention on 
the personal thoughts and feelings regarding the object.   
Across several attitude domains, evidence supports the idea that these modifications to the 
traditional IAT procedure may indeed reduce the influence of extrapersonal associations on the    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  6
IAT effect. In Olson and Fazio’s (2004) experiments 1-2, the personalized IAT exhibited less 
racial bias than the traditional IAT, confirming the assumption that negative extrapersonal 
associations about Black people may reflect negative culturally-shared stereotypes. In experiment 
3, Olson and Fazio (2004) found the traditional IAT to reflect greater preference for apples over 
candy bars than the personalized IAT, suggesting that positive extrapersonal associations about 
apples may inflate the traditional IAT effect. Han et al. (2006) experimentally created both 
attitudes and extrapersonal associations about game characters and showed that both attitudes and 
extrapersonal associations affected the traditional IAT while only attitudes affected the 
personalized IAT. In all these studies, differences between the two IAT variants were apparent 
with both the conventional (Greenwald et al., 1998) and D-scoring procedures (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) for the calculation of the IAT effects.   
Predicting Attitude Changes with the Two IAT Versions 
 
Extant research suggests that persuasive messages can exert widely different effects on 
attitude measures captured by the IAT. Recently, Briñol et al. (in press) provided a 
comprehensive review of that research and proposed a framework for the possible mechanisms 
underlying attitude change captured by the IAT. We build on that framework to develop 
propositions about the processes underlying the differential sensitivity of the two IAT variants to 
persuasion attempts.  
Briñol et al. argue that detection of attitude changes with implicit techniques depends on 
the level of elaboration involved in the persuasion process (ranging from fully automatic to fully 
deliberative processes). Existing literature is quite equivocal about the conclusion that low-
thought processes can alter, at least temporarily, the types of automatic associations linked to the 
object. In this respect, the IAT has been shown to be sensitive to persuasion techniques like 
classical conditioning and mere exposure (e. g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Lowery et al.,    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  7
2001; Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006). Under high elaboration conditions, the picture is 
somewhat different. Recently, Brinol et al. proposed a compelling explanation for the mechanism 
underlying implicit attitude change through deliberative processes. When a message is processed 
in detail, each positive or negative argument is carefully assessed in terms of its validity with 
respect to one’s own positive or negative attitude toward the object. If the message presents 
strong convincing arguments, this thoughtful process should lead to attitude rehearsal, whereby 
the positive or negative aspects of one’s attitude become more accessible regarding the object. 
The effect of this attitude rehearsal should be apparent in the IAT, by facilitating the completion 
of either its compatible or incompatible task, whichever response mapping more closely 
corresponds to the individual’s attitude. However, if the message presents weak arguments, 
argument-consistent attitude rehearsal is less likely to occur because individuals would easily 
dismiss or counterargue the message. Thus, a weak message is expected to produce less attitude 
change on the IAT than a strong message under high elaboration conditions. Brinol et al. provide 
several experiments that support this theorizing.  
In this research, just like Briñol et al., we focus our attention on persuasion under high 
elaboration conditions. Because research to date has mostly used the traditional IAT, we extend 
Briñol et al.’s reasoning by considering the potentially differential sensitivity of IAT type 
(traditional vs. personalized) on the measurement outcome. We argue that a persuasive message 
under high elaboration can exert differential effects on the two IAT variants depending on 
message strength. On the one hand, if the persuasion is sufficiently strong, it is likely to shape 
personal attitudes through attitude rehearsal, whereby message-consistent personal associations 
will become more accessible. However, depending on the attitude domain, the traditional IAT 
may or may not fully reflect these real changes in personal attitudes because extrapersonal 
associations can potentially interfere with its measurement outcome. For example, in domains    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  8
where negative/positive cultural stereotypes are prevalent, such as attitudes toward specific social 
groups or food preferences, attitude-inconsistent extrapersonal associations may be highly salient 
whenever one evaluates those groups. In such situations, even if a persuasion attempt 
successfully manages to change personal attitudes, the presence of extrapersonal associations 
may still mask the full extent of attitude change on the traditional IAT. Because of its potentially 
greater sensitivity to personal associations, we expect the measurement outcome to be more 
sensitive to strong persuasion attempts in the personalized IAT than in the traditional IAT.  
To illustrate our reasoning, consider the example of a gourmet person who is fond of 
chocolate, mainly for hedonic reasons. His positive attitude toward chocolate thus stems from the 
positive personal associations about the taste of this delicacy. He is of course conscious that 
chocolate is a high calorie food; however, let’s assume that this negative association does not 
contribute to his overall positive attitude about chocolate and therefore remains an extrapersonal 
association. Because the traditional IAT is affected by this extrapersonal association, it is likely 
that it would yield a less positive attitude estimate for this person than the personalized IAT 
would. If this person were to read a strong positive message about some additional benefits of 
chocolate (e.g., contains antioxidants), his attitude will probably become even more positive to 
chocolate than before. However, the negative extrapersonal associations can partially mask this 
positive attitude change on the traditional, but not on the personalized IAT. We thus expect that a 
strong persuasive message will affect the measurement outcome more in the personalized IAT 
than in the traditional IAT.   
   On the other hand, if the persuasion is weak, no real attitude change occurs. Such 
messages can probably not affect personal associations but can, at least in the short term, remain 
salient as an extrapersonal association about the object. To return to our previous example, if our 
gourmet person hears a friend telling him a rather unbelievable story about chocolate causing    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT  9
choking hazards, this message may, at best, become a negative extrapersonal association.  Due to 
its sensitivity to extrapersonal associations, the traditional IAT can indicate some change in such 
situations; the personalized IAT is less likely to do so. Extant research seems supportive of this 
possibility. For example, Han et al. (2006) showed that traditional (but not personalized) IAT 
measures were indeed affected by an unjustified, objectively inaccurate statement of preference 
on the part of two young children – in effect, by a weak counterattitudinal message. We thus 
expect that a weak persuasive message will affect the measurement outcome more in the 
traditional than in the personalized IAT.   
Experiment 1 
 
  The purpose of our first experiment was to investigate the potentially greater sensitivity of 
the personalized (vs. traditional) IAT in detecting attitude change after a strong persuasion 
attempt in a domain where extrapersonal associations are prevalent. Our choice fell on the 
domain of luxuries because luxury products and brands are characterized by a great variety of 
potential associations, including quality-related beliefs, hedonic benefits and prestige 
connotations. It is likely that between-person discrepancies characterize the valence of those 
associations (e. g., the high price of luxuries may be a positive aspect for one person and a 
negative aspect for another person). In addition, given the substantial social visibility and social 
function of those items, the evaluation of luxury items is subject to attitude reports where social 
norms, as well as socially desirable responding could be prevalent. That is, people may easily 
associate luxuries with extrapersonal information they do not necessarily endorse personally. For 
example, a person with a favorable attitude to BMW cars may evoke a variety of thoughts about 
the BMW brand, including its sporty engines, comfortable interior, high reliability, that is, 
thoughts that contribute to his or her positive attitude toward the brand (i. e., personal 
associations). At the same time, this person may acknowledge that some people find BMW to be    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 10
overpriced and snobbish (extrapersonal associations). These latter two associations may be 
salient at the time the attitude measure is taken, yet they may not affect this person’s globally 
positive attitude toward BMW. 
  Method 
Materials. The experiments were conducted in the Paris area in France. Experimental 
materials were developed on the basis of 16 interviews with participants aged between 17 and 70. 
Participants were asked to remember and describe their recent acquisitions of, or experiences 
with luxury items. They were then asked to describe their views about luxuries in general and the 
various product/service categories and brands associated with them. We adapted characteristic 
sections from those interviews to design various persuasive messages presenting luxuries in 
either a negative or positive light (see the Appendix for the complete set of selected materials).  
Participants and procedure. Two-hundred and nineteen undergraduate students 
participated as part of a course requirement. The experiment was divided into two sessions, with 
a two-week delay between them. In session 1, participants were asked to write down their 
“thoughts coming to mind when thinking about luxury brands.” Boxes were provided for each of 
the thoughts and participants were asked to use up as many boxes as necessary. After this, they 
were asked to code each of the thoughts according to their valence (negative/positive/neutral). 
Session 2 was a 2 (message arguments: negative, positive) × 2 (IAT type: traditional, 
personalized) between-subjects design. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to 
investigate “how people form impressions of other people on the basis of interview excerpts.” 
Participants were randomly assigned to the negative and positive arguments conditions, the full 
details of which are presented in the Appendix. The negative arguments emphasized the snobbery 
that characterizes users of luxury brands, whereas the positive arguments focused on 
considerations of exceptional quality. Participants read an introductory sentence explaining that    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 11
the excerpts came from an interview with “Eric who is 50 and lives in Paris.” Participants were 
then presented with the interview excerpts and were asked to read them carefully so as to be able 
to form a first impression of the source. After reading the interview materials, participants 
responded to the following items on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale: “This 
person thinks that luxury brands mean snobbery”(reverse-coded), “This person thinks that luxury 
brands are well regarded in society”, and “Overall, this person thinks that luxuries are a good 
thing”. These items were averaged to serve as checks for the message valence manipulation. 
Participants also responded to three items intended to capture their first impressions of the source 
(unpleasant/pleasant, not sympathetic/sympathetic, negative/positive), all measured on seven-
point scales. This latter scale was intended to measure argument strength, with the expectation 
that participants would form more favorable impressions of people presenting more (vs. less) 
credible arguments. After this, participants were randomly assigned to the traditional or 
personalized IAT, implemented on Inquisit 2.0 software. 
Both IATs featured the target concepts luxury brands vs. common brands. The 
representative exemplars for the concept of luxury brands were selected on the basis of a pretest 
and featured prestigious international brands in the couture and car industries including Chanel, 
Vuitton, Dior, Gucci, Mercedes and Ferrari. For common brands, the most frequently cited in the 
pretest and, hence, selected for use were Zara (clothing brand), H&M (clothing brand), Ariel 
(detergent), Monoprix (grocery retailer), Bic (office furniture) and Carrefour (retailer). Valence 
attributes included peace, paradise, joy, love, pleasure and happiness for positive attributes and 
disaster, grief, accident, pain, bad and agony for negative attributes. In the traditional IAT we 
employed Greenwald et al.’s (1998) procedure. In the personalized IAT we followed one of the 
variants developed by Olson and Fazio (2004). The test implemented differed from the traditional 
IAT in two important respects. First, no error feedback was given to participants. Second, the    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 12
category labels were changed from pleasant to I like and from unpleasant to I don’t like. Thus, 
the compatible block of the personalized IAT consisted of combined tasks with the labels luxury 
brands and I like and common brands and I don’t like; the incompatible block featured the labels 
luxury brands and I don’t like and common brands and I like. The purpose of these changes was 
to limit the potentially strong normative effects on the IAT, thus reducing the relative influence 
of extrapersonal associations and increasing the relative influence of personal associations on the 
outcome of the measure.  
Results  
 
Descriptive statistics in Session 1. On average, 47 % of the thoughts participants wrote 
were positive, 30.9% were negative and 21.1% were neutral, reflecting a globally rather positive 
view of luxury brands in the sample.  
Manipulation checks in Session 2. The message valence manipulation was successful 
because compared to the negative arguments condition, participants in the positive arguments 
condition found the source’s thoughts about luxuries to be less snobbish (M = 5.61 vs. M = 1.57, 
F(1, 217) = 435.42, p < 10
-6), better regarded in society (M = 5.34 vs. M = 1.42, F(1, 217) = 
788.80, p < 10
-6) and globally good things (M = 5.80 vs. M = 1.63, F(1, 217) = 945.49, p < 10
-6). 
Compared to the negative arguments condition, participants in the positive arguments condition 
also formed better impressions of the source in terms of pleasantness (M = 4.28 vs. M = 3.43, 
F(1, 217) = 20.36, p = 10
-5), sympathy (M = 4.30 vs. M = 3.45, F(1, 217) = 21.64, p < 10
-5) and 
positiveness (M = 4.26 vs. M = 3.44, F(1, 217) = 20.46, p < 10
-5). This latter result, combined 
with the fact that our respondent held rather positive views of luxuries, suggests that IAT scores 
should be more favorable toward luxury brands in the positive (vs. negative) arguments 
condition.  We are interested in knowing which of the IAT versions, traditional or personalized, 
prove more sensitive to this exposure to the differently valenced arguments.      Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 13
Descriptive IAT statistics. D-measures for the IAT effect were calculated following the 
scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al. (2003). Mean error rates in both IATs were low 
(3.9% in the traditional IAT and 5.4% in the personalized IAT). Corroborating session 1 findings, 
participants across experimental conditions revealed a strong preference for luxury brands (vs. 
common brands) on both IATs (traditional: M = .38, t(112) = 8.96, p < 10
-6; personalized: M = 
.48, t(106) = 11.18, p < 10
-6).  
Evidence of attitude change with the two IAT versions. A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted 
with IAT effect as a dependent variable and message arguments and IAT type as factors. A 
marginally significant effect emerged for IAT type, F(1, 215) = 2.82, p = 0.09, qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction between message arguments and IAT type, F(1, 215) = 3.77, p = 
0.05. The IAT effect as a function of message arguments and IAT type are represented in Figure 
1. Simple contrasts showed that in the personalized IAT, the IAT effect was more positive after 
the positive arguments (M = .59) than after the negative arguments (M = .38), F(1, 215) = 5.76, p 
= .017; however, such a difference was not observed in the traditional IAT (M = .40 vs. M = .37, 
F(1, 215) = 5.76, p = .746). These results suggest that if attitude change occurred as a result of 
the positive arguments, this change seems to have been detected with the personalized but not the 
traditional IAT. 
We also investigated how IAT scores were affected by impressions about the source 
across the experimental conditions. If attitude change indeed occurred and if it was only captured 
by the personalized IAT, then IAT scores should be related to impression about the source in the 
personalized but not in the traditional IAT. By conducting multiple linear regressions using 
Aiken and West’s methods (1991), the following findings emerged. In the personalized IAT, IAT 
scores were regressed on impression about source (average of three items), message arguments (0 
= negative, 1 = positive), and the impression about source × message arguments cross-product.    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 14
This regression resulted in a negative coefficient for impression about interviewee (t(106) = –
2.62, p = .01), a positive coefficient for experimental condition (t(106) = 3.27, p = .001) and a 
positive coefficient for the interaction term (t (106) = 2.49, p = .01), R
2 = .14, F(3, 104) = 5.74, p 
<  .01. To probe the significant interaction, the slopes of regression lines for the negative and 
positive experimental conditions were tested.  In the negative arguments condition, as expected, a 
negative relation between impression about the source and IAT scores was observed, t = –2.61, p 
= .01; the more favorably the interviewee was viewed, the less positive the IAT score. In the 
positive arguments condition, again as expected, a positive relation between impression about the 
source and IAT scores was observed, t = 9.49, p < .01; more favorable views of the interviewee 
were associated with more positive IAT scores. A similar regression analysis conducted on the 
traditional IAT scores yielded non-significant estimates, R
2 = .002, F(3, 106) = .09, p =  .97.   
To provide further evidence of attitude change being captured more by the personalized 
IAT than the traditional IAT, we investigated the relationships between thought measures in 
session 1 with IAT effects in session 2. To do so, we first created a thought listing index 
reflecting pre-exposure attitudes by subtracting, for each participant, the percentage of positive 
thoughts from the percentage of negative thoughts. If the traditional IAT is less affected by 
attitude change than the personalized IAT, then traditional IAT effects should be more correlated 
with the pre-exposure thought index than is true for the personalized IAT scores. This seems to 
be indeed the case. With the traditional IAT, IAT scores in session 2 correlated positively with 
the thought index in session 1 (r = .244, p = .011). With the personalized IAT, IAT scores in 
session 2 did not correlate significantly with the thought index in session 1 (r = .092, p = .372). 
Although the difference between the two correlations was only marginally significant (z = 1.69, p 
= .091), the directional results provide additional evidence for the likelihood of attitude change 
being captured more by the personalized than by the traditional IAT.      Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 15
Discussion 
  
The goal of this experiment was to investigate whether the personalized IAT would be 
more sensitive in detecting attitude changes than the traditional IAT. To do so, we developed 
negative and positive persuasion messages intended to produce changes in how people view 
luxury brands. Our preliminary analyses showed that the positive arguments looked more 
conducive to produce attitude change than the negative arguments. Indeed, when negative 
arguments were presented about luxuries, we observed no differences between the traditional or 
personalized IAT effects. However, when positive arguments were presented about luxuries, the 
personalized IAT showed a positive change but the traditional IAT did not. The relationships 
established between pre-exposure thought measures and IAT effects also supported the 
differential sensitivity of the two IAT variants to the induced positive attitude change. A tentative 
explanation for this latter finding could be the possibility that for some people, certain negative 
extrapersonal associations (e. g., the snobbishness of luxuries) remained activated after reading 
strong positive arguments about the quality of luxury brands. If so, then the salience of those 
extrapersonal associations could have obscured the detection of attitude change with the 
traditional IAT but not with the personalized IAT. Our second experiment was designed to more 
directly investigate this possibility. Also, our interpretation of the findings was based on the 
assumption that participants perceived the messages presented to them as strong. In Experiment 
2, we manipulate the messages to create persuasion attempts of varying strength.  
Experiment 2 
 
The attitude objects considered in this experiment were again luxury brands. We focused 
only on positive arguments because Experiment 1 suggested that this is where a difference 
between the traditional and personalized IAT effects occurred in the present context. We 
hypothesized that negative extrapersonal associations could be responsible for the traditional IAT    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 16
producing lower effects than the personalized IAT after a positive persuasion attempt. Our 
explanation was based on the likelihood of extrapersonal associations interfering with the 
traditional IAT, thereby limiting its capacity to capture real changes in personal attitudes. 
However, our first experiment did not provide direct evidence for extrapersonal associations 
being responsible for the effects observed. In our second experiment, we changed the 
experimental design and procedure so as to be able to more directly identify specific 
extrapersonal associations obscuring the detection of attitude change with the traditional IAT.  
The design included a first condition with no persuasive attempt at all so as to assess the 
relative extent of attitude change observed in the experimental conditions. Experiment 1 relied 
upon a comparison of conditions in which positive or negative arguments had been presented. In 
contrast, Experiment 2 employs a baseline control condition. This will enable an examination of 
how scores on the traditional and personalized IATs differ in the absence of a persuasive 
communication. 
In Experiment 1, a strong positive message appeared to induce positive attitude change to 
which the personalized IAT proved sensitive but the traditional did not. In the second condition 
of Experiment 2, we employed this same strong positive message, but sought to introduce 
contexts that would make negative extrapersonal associations more or less salient. Our argument 
is that the natural salience of negative extrapersonal associations led to decreased evidence of 
attitude change on the traditional IAT. To lessen the potential influence of such information, we 
introduced the strong positive argument with a clear statement that the particular interview had 
been selected because it was very representative of the collective opinion expressed within the 
interviewed sample. We expected both IAT variants to detect positive attitude change in this 
condition.     Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 17
Experiment 2 also included a third condition in which a negative extrapersonal association 
was made very salient immediately after the presentation of the strong positive arguments. In this 
condition, a brief interview with another person, explicitly labelled as unrepresentative of the 
interviewed sample, introduced mention of a negative comment about the snobbishness of 
luxuries. We expected this weak negative comment to increase the salience of a negative 
extrapersonal association; however, we did not expect this comment to undermine the positive 
attitude change induced by the strong positive arguments. Thus, we expected the traditional IAT 
to be affected by this negative comment and evidence less positive attitude change than in the 
condition in which only the positive argument was presented. On the other hand, we expected the 
personalized IAT to remain impervious to the negative comment and evidence the same positive 
attitude change as in the positive argument alone condition.    
 Method 
Materials. Materials in the positive arguments condition were similar to those of 
Experiment 1, with the only difference being a brief sentence introducing the arguments as 
representative of the global view of the sample on luxuries. We relied on the pretest of the 
previous experiment to develop experimental materials involving a negative argument. The focal 
topic of this short negative argument, presented as unrepresentative of most interviewees, was the 
apparent snobbishness of luxury brands. We expected the argument to be too weak to induce 
attitude change (i. e., we did not expect it to affect personal associations about the object). 
However, we expected that this negative comment would provide people with a negative 
extrapersonal association that would be salient when luxury brands were later categorized in the 
traditional version of the IAT. 
Participants and procedure. Two-hundred and two undergraduate students participated in 
a 3 (message arguments: no arguments; positive arguments; positive arguments followed by a    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 18
negative argument) × 2 (IAT type: traditional, personalized) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Participants in the no 
arguments condition only completed either the traditional or personalized IAT about luxury 
brands vs. common brands. In the other two conditions, participants were told that the present 
research investigated how people formed impressions about unknown people on the basis of 
various interview excerpts. Participants in the positive arguments condition read the same 
positive interview excerpts used in Experiment 1 about the 50-year old Eric, preceded by the 
information that his opinions were representative of what most interviewed people thought (see 
Appendix). After reading the entire set of interview excerpts, they responded to a series of 
manipulation check questions comprising the ones about message valence used in Experiment 1. 
We also included three additional items measured on 1-7 scales intended to check the message 
strength manipulation (not interesting/interesting, weak/strong, not convincing/convincing). After 
this, participants completed either the traditional or personalized IAT used in Experiment 1. 
Participants in the positive arguments + negative argument condition followed a similar 
procedure, with the only difference that after reading and evaluating the representative positive 
arguments presented by Eric, they also read a short interview excerpt from another person, 
Michel, 35, commenting on the snobbery of luxury brands (see Appendix). Michel’s comment 
was presented as unrepresentative of the sampled people. Identical manipulation checks were 
taken after this interview excerpt, too.  
Results 
 
Manipulation checks. In the condition in which positive arguments were followed by the 
brief negative comment of another interviewee, participants evaluated the target’s attitude toward 
luxuries as more positive after reading the positive (M = 5.34) than the negative arguments (M = 
2.37), t(71) = 19.74, p < 10
-6. They also evaluated the positive (vs. negative) arguments as more    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 19
interesting (M = 4.54 vs. M = 3.57, t(71) = 4.08, p < .0001), stronger (M = 3.67 vs. M = 2.93, 
t(71) = 3.41, p < .001) and more convincing (M = 3.90 vs. M = 3.17, t(71) = 3.03, p = .003). 
These results suggest that the manipulation of message valence and strength occurred as 
intended. 
Descriptive IAT statistics. D-measures for the IAT effect were calculated following the 
scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al. (2003). Mean error rates in both IATs were low 
(4% in the traditional IAT and 4.74% in the personalized IAT). Corroborating Experiment 1 
findings, participants across experimental conditions revealed a strong preference for luxury 
brands (vs. common brands) on both IATs (traditional: M = .35, t(102) = 8.76, p < 10
-6; 
personalized: M = .51, t(99) = 12.50, p < 10
-6).  
Evidence of attitude change with the two IAT versions. A 3 × 2 ANOVA was conducted 
with IAT effect as a dependent variable and message arguments and IAT type as factors. The IAT 
effect as a function of message arguments and IAT type are presented in Figure 2. Significant 
main effects for both message arguments (F(2, 196) = 7.40, p = 0.001) and IAT type (F(1, 196) = 
7.92, p = 0.005) emerged. Those main effects were qualified by a significant two-way interaction 
between message arguments and IAT type, F(2, 196) = 3.40, p = 0.035. Simple contrasts showed 
that in absence of persuasion (i.e., in the no arguments condition) participants completing the 
personalized IAT exhibited more positive attitudes toward luxuries (M = .39) than participants 
completing the traditional IAT (M = .21), F(1, 196) = 3.95, p = 0.048. This result is consistent 
with our hypothesis about possible negative extrapersonal associations affecting the traditional 
IAT, which has the likely consequence of producing a less positive baseline attitude score on the 
traditional IAT than the personalized.  
Let us now examine how each of the IATs varies across the two conditions in which 
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presented, the traditional IAT reflects a positive attitude change (M = .58) compared to the 
baseline (M = .21), F(1, 196) = 14.89, p = 0.0001. However, if the positive arguments are 
immediately followed by a negative argument, the traditional IAT measure is substantially 
reduced (M = .28) compared to the positive arguments only condition (M = .58), F(1, 196) = 
10.27, p = 0.002. Indeed, if the positive arguments are immediately followed by a negative 
argument, no attitude change is detected with the traditional IAT (M = .28) compared to the 
baseline (M = .21), F(1, 196) = .54, p = 0.461. The pattern of results is different with the 
personalized IAT. When only positive arguments are presented, the personalized IAT reflects a 
positive attitude change (M = .54) compared to the baseline (M = .39), F(1, 196) = 2.77, p = 0.09. 
Likewise, if the positive arguments are immediately followed by a negative argument, a positive 
attitude change is still detected (M = .59) compared to the baseline (M = .39), F(1, 196) = 4.08, p 
= 0.048. These results support our prediction that the negative extrapersonal association activated 
through a weak message may mask an attitude change if the traditional IAT, but not if the 
personalized IAT, is used. 
Discussion 
 
  We hypothesized that strong positive arguments would induce changes in personal 
associations, leading to a globally positive attitude change. A relatively weak negative argument 
would not produce such an effect but would rather heighten the salience of negative extrapersonal 
associations about the snobbishness of luxury brands. The pattern of results observed in 
Experiment 2 supports these expectations. A strong positive message likely induced attitude 
change and this change was captured by both IATs. However, if this attitude change was 
followed by a weak counter message, the traditional IAT failed to evidence the original attitude 
change anymore and looked heavily affected by that message. Not so the personalized IAT, 
which exhibited a measurement outcome still reflecting attitude change. From the perspective of    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 21
the framework adopted in this paper, this pattern of results further evidences that the traditional 
IAT is highly sensitive to extrapersonal associations that are salient at the time the attitude 
assessment is made.  
General Discussion 
 
Extant research on the IAT’s validity has provided mixed evidence about the sensitivity of 
IAT measures to various persuasion attempts. In this research, we attempted to provide one 
possible explanation for these discrepancies from a methodological perspective. By relying on 
Olson and Fazio’s typology of personal vs. extrapersonal associations, we proposed that the 
traditional IAT implemented in most prior research can sometimes fail to capture the full extent 
of attitude change in domains where extrapersonal associations are prevalent. The two 
experiments presented support the view that the traditional and personalized IATs are 
differentially sensitive to persuasion in such attitude domains.  
The present findings are all the more meaningful when considered in conjunction with the 
Han et al. (2006) research. That work demonstrated that the traditional IAT can be sensitive to a 
rather trivial, unjustified and objectively incorrect remark offered by two 10-year old children. 
The remark did not produce attitude change as evidenced by its failure to affect either the 
personalized IAT or a priming measure, but it did serve as an attitudinally inconsistent 
extrapersonal association. As a result, the traditional IAT scores suggested that change had 
occurred in response to the boys’ comment, when other measures, including assessments of the 
boys, suggested that it had not. The present research illustrates what might be considered the flip 
side: attitudes did change as a function of a strong positive message, and that change was 
consistently evident on the personalized IAT. However, in Experiment 1, the traditional IAT 
failed to reveal such change. In Experiment 2, a brief comment about the snobbishness of luxury 
brands, by an interviewee whose opinion was explicitly labelled as unrepresentative, was    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 22
sufficient to render the traditional IAT insensitive to the attitude change produced by the strong 
positive arguments. Only when that positive message had been identified as representative of all 
the interviewees sampled and not followed by the presumably rare comment to the contrary did 
the traditional IAT reveal the change that was apparent on the personalized IAT. Thus, due to its 
susceptibility to extrapersonal associaitons, the traditional can suggest change where none has 
occurred, as in Han et al. (2006), or fail to reveal change that has occurred, as in the present 
work.  
Of course, further research should implement the two IAT variants across a variety of 
domains to experimentally ascertain our proposition that only in domains where extrapersonal 
associations are prevalent does a difference between the two IATs occur. We suspect, and the 
current data certainly suggest, that luxury brands are understood to be associated with 
snobbishness, but that for many people this understanding is irrelevant to their positive view of 
the quality of such brands and their liking for them. It is for this reason that the traditional and 
personalized versions of the IAT diverged. But, a very different pattern might emerge for attitude 
objects characterized by attributes that are homogenous in their evaluative implications. The 
likelihood of extrapersonal associations would be minimal in such cases. It is when objects 
involve a variety of attributes with mixed evaluative implications, some of which might form the 
basis of an individual’s attitude and some of which might have been deemed irrelevant or even 
rejected, that extrapersonal knowledge exists.   
In a broader perspective, implicit cognition research may benefit from a deeper 
investigation of the nature of associations captured by different implicit measures. Such an 
enterprise is not without difficulties, however. Indeed, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) 
propose that one possible perspective on the distinction between personal and extrapersonal 
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knowledge) must be an essential part of the association. They argue however, that this 
implication is somewhat far-stretched on the basis of extant research indicating that source and 
information are stored independently in memory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Kumkale & Albarracin, 2004). We do agree with Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) that the 
personal/extrapersonal distinction would not have those unlikely implications, and for this reason, 
does not provide explanations about the origins of a particular association. Olson and Fazio’s 
(2004) typology of personal-extrapersonal associations merely implies that some accessible 
associations do not contribute to the individual’s own evaluation of the object. The typology 
actually does not theorize either about the exact source of associations or the availability of 
associations to introspection. Indeed, extrapersonal associations can be very different from one 
person to another; those associations may originate from a variety of sources including cultural 
stereotypes, media information, friend’s opinion, etc.; and people may or may not be aware of the 
exact source of a particular association. In addition, as individual attitudes form and evolve over 
time, the status of an association can change from personal to extrapersonal and vice-versa, 
depending on its chronically stronger or weaker link to the attitude node. Thus, determining the 
origins of personal/extrapersonal associations is a complex issue in domains people interact with 
on an everyday basis.  
Despite the complexity of the distinction between personal and extrapersonal associations, 
its relevance to the IAT is further substantiated by the present findings. As a result of the 
influence of an extrapersonal association, the IAT as traditionally implemented can obscure the 
presence of attitude change or imply that change has occurred when it has not. Thus, if one’s 
interest is in assessing people’s current attitudes toward a category of objects, there appears to be 
considerable value to personalizing the IAT.  




Materials in Experiment 1 
 
Negative Arguments 
Please carefully read the following excerpts from an interview with Eric, 50, living in Paris: 
 
“In the super luxury boutiques, I wouldn’t feel at ease there, it’s not my environment. I don’t 
know why I associate it with the desire to appear to be something, something that’s hollow. I 
don’t wish to identify with people who live like this, no, not at all. In posh neighborhoods, there 
are some chic ladies and I find them unsympathetic. It’s negative, show-off, these people are not 
aware of the value of their money. If you systematically go to upmarket shops, that’s a proof of 
snobbism” 
 
“Luxuries are a little negative to me, this word has a negative side, meaning show-off. There are 
lots of people who are very conscious about the image luxury brands can give them. Well, you 
can see it from afar and it’s always the same thing, those people are “nouveaux riches”.   Those 
people don’t know how to truly enjoy life. Normally, if you are OK, you don’t need to open your 
jacket to exhibit where it comes from. Only people who want to impress others open their jacket 
to say; “well, have you seen my jacket, have you seen my shoes, these are Weston shoes …”  It’s 
just stupid.  They do it because they want to belong to a social class, they want to say “You see, I 
belong to high society, I’m an important guy because I have an Yves Saint-Laurent suit.  This is 
all about show-off ” 
 
“It would almost amount to provocation to drive a Jaguar, compared to people who don’t have 
the means to buy a Jaguar. There are people who have a 500 m
2 house and 5 Mercedes, this is 
provocation because you can’t forget about the world that lives around you. For me, Mercedes is 
the car for parvenu people if you like. You have a Mercedes, you have a status, that’s what it 
means” 
 
“To only live in luxury and to be constrained to choose only big name things, big brands, because 
you think other things are not worthy of you, well, that must be hell. I don’t envy those people 
because all the things that relate to luxury, well, the social side of it is related to it as well. Plus a 
certain kind of people. If you only have luxury things, this means that you only have luxury 
friends too. And if someone feels constrained to say, I only like luxuries, if this person only 
chooses something because it’s Chanel, well, that’s stupid.” 
 
“Hermes scarves and Vuitton handbags are ostentatious luxuries. Really, a woman with a Hermes 
scar and a Vuitton bag. This is ultimate superficiality … This kind of thing associated with 
luxuries is strongly negative for me.  Luxury is also big cars. Luxury in the sense of showing off 
your wealth, strength or success, that is a big engine, a huge car etc… this type of thing has no 
hold on me. What I said about  Hermes and Vuitton is quite characteristic of what I think of 
luxury brands. Mercedes for example, really, someone who has a Mercedes and there are some I 
know of, those people are ridiculous … These are negative connotations, because all this is a 
matter of external aspects”    Detecting  Attitude  Change with the IAT 25
 
“Regarding glasses, I don’t care about brands. For sure I would avoid buying a frame with the 
name Dior, St-Laurent, Nina Ricci or whatever written on it … written in big letters, I refuse to 
do that. Someone who is fond of upscale things would be someone who cares about brands in the 
first place, that is, buys a brand because it’s a famous brand ...Someone who goes to a hotel 
because it’s a five-star hotel, who will buy  Mercedes. So someone who will only care for the 
brand’s reputation to show off. It’s a little bit about showing off. Dior, for example, it’s about 
couture, fragrance, it’s about international show-off. People buy Dior because it’s Dior. Walking 
around with a Dior bag, no, I’d find it totally ridiculous, I’d certainly avoid doing that.” 
 
Positive Arguments 
Please carefully read the following excerpts from an interview with Eric, 50, living in Paris: 
 
“For some things, I will take luxury. If it’s for a gift, you have to buy a name brand. I can buy a 
prestige champagne if it’s necessary, for very memorable events or as a gift. If I’m about to 
present a gift to someone, well, I will not buy an unknown brand.  To simplify the purchase, I 
will go to a great department store, I’d for example only go to the Bon Marché in Paris” 
 
“I have memories of exquisite, mysterious hotels, giving the impression of entering a cozy, 
closed world, and I'm very sensitive to the charm of that kind of hotel.  If we take the Mamounia 
as an example, I was 15 when I first came into contact there with luxury hotels, the thing that 
really impressed me was that it was a hotel for heads of state. This was where Churchill had spent 
much of his time during the war.  And in the end, what people enjoy about luxury hotels, it’s 
being on the other side of the wall. Finally, passing to the other side of the wall is essential.  At 
the San Regis hotel in Paris, a coffee costs 10 euros but you feel truly happy, you don’t regret 
those 10 euros” 
 
“Now if I go out for dinner with a friend, really to go out, in this case it will depend on the 
person, on what he or she will like But I may say, Well, why don’t we go to the Tour d’Argent or 
something like that … If I know they would appreciate, then why not !” 
 
“On an evening out, or an a day of invitation or reception, or something like that, I think you 
have to wear a certain attire … If we go to a gala dinner or something like that, banquets by 
friends, if we see someone who is not dressed according to our criteria, we say to each other, this 
one, well, this person could have made an effort to dress properly.  If you wear luxury clothes, 
well-designed ones, you don’t have to pay attention to a certain number of things. For me, luxury 
means basically taking a cab instead of taking the underground, eating out in restaurants often, 
staying in great hotels when I’m on a trip” 
 
“Regarding great wines, we have some fine bottles but we only open them if we invite 
connoisseur friends that we want to make a special honor to.  I sometimes drink fine wines with 
friends who are really knowledgeable about them.  We sometimes order a thing like that in a 
restaurant, it may happen. If you are with people who share the same preferences as you or if you 
are celebrating an event, then you can make an even bigger effort, you can buy something very 
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It’s something rare, something that’s exceptional. So something that needs exceptional moments 
with people who appreciate that. It is for quality guests only, in the sense of people who will like 
it. I can offer wine as a gift, I sometimes take a bottle or two out of the cellar to offer it to people 
who will really like them” 
 
“If I buy cognac for my guests, in this case I will not buy the average quality, I will buy 
something better, of superior quality, that is, VSOP, something better than average. I have 
already given great cognacs to some people as a gift. I may choose it depending on the 
packaging, on the case … It’s true that visual appearance counts a lot for the person who receives 
it … and also for one who is buying it. It must give pleasure to the recipient if it’s nicely 
presented … The way it looks like counts a lot” 
 
Materials in Experiment 2 
Positive Arguments 
Please carefully read the following excerpts from an interview with Eric, 50, living in Paris. His 
thoughts are actually quite representative of how most people think in the sample we interviewed. 
 
Remainder of materials identical to Experiment 1 
Positive Arguments Followed by a Negative Argument 
Same as above, followed by: 
 
Please carefully read the following excerpts from another interview with Michel, 35, who also 
lives in Paris. His thoughts are not really representative of how most people think in the sample 
we interviewed. 
 
“I don’t know, maybe I would avoid buying a frame with the name Dior, St-Laurent, Nina Ricci 
or whatever written on it … I’m not very familiar with those brands. Someone who is fond of 
luxury things would be someone who cares about brands in the first place, that is, buys a brand 
because it’s a famous brand ... Someone who goes to a hotel because it’s a five-star hotel, who 
will buy  Mercedes. Dior, for example, it’s about couture, fragrance, it’s a little bit about show-
off” 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. IAT Effect as a Function of Message Arguments and IAT Type in Experiment 1 
 
Figure 2. IAT Effect as a Function of Message Arguments and IAT Type in Experiment 2 
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